Welcome to the research page of TASZK Security Labs!
Here you can find a collection of advisories from coordinated disclosures, publications of our original research work, and the occasional infosec war stories and musings.
Recent Articles
2024-07-29
by Daniel Komaromy, Lorant Szabo, Laszlo Szapula
Samsung baseband
We have written extensively about remote baseband vulnerability research in the past, examining various vendors’ baseband OS micro-architectures and exploring their implementations for remotely exploitable bugs. So have many others. One might say, our research exists in the context in which it lives and what came before it: whether it be about finding (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) or exploiting (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14) vulnerabilities.
However, one area that has been absent from prior art was a direct examination of lower layers of Radio Layer protocols for security vulnerabilities.
In our previous blog post, we have introduced our latest research into full chain baseband exploits. We have showcased new research tools (our nanoMIPS decompiler, debugger, and emulator for Mediatek basebands) and explored the interconnected components across the Cellular Processor and the Application Processor of Samsung and Mediatek radio interface stacks.
The most serious of vulnerabilities in these interfaces can lead to over-the-air exploitation of the device: zero-click remote code execution not only in the baseband, but in the Android runtime as well.
It’s no secret that baseband full-chains of this kind have existed privately and been used In-The-Wild, as recently documented by the “Predator Files” disclosures, for example.
Recent Advisories
We have identified a new buffer overflow vulnerability in Samsung’s baseband implementation (mainly used in Exynos chipsets). The vulnerability can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution in the baseband runtime.
The vulnerability we are disclosing in this advisory affected a wide range of Samsung devices, including phones on the newest Exynos chipsets. The November 2023 issue of the Samsung Semiconductor Security Bulletin contains this vulnerability as CVE-2023-41111.
Vulnerability Details Background: Data Block Format and Re-assembly in RLC In GPRS, an LLC layer PDU can be up to 1560 bytes long, but the maximum size for an RLC data block is 22/32/38/52 for the GPRS coding schemes CS-1/2/3/4, respectively.
We have identified several new heap buffer overflow vulnerabilities in Samsung’s baseband implementation (mainly used in Exynos chipsets): three different heap buffer overflows in the same function, to be precise.
The most critical of these vulnerabilities can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution in the baseband runtime.
The vulnerabilities we are disclosing in this advisory affected a wide range of Samsung devices, including phones on the newest Exynos chipsets. The vulnerability report covering all three that we reported together was assigned CVE-2023-41112, which was published in the 2023 November issue of Samsung Semiconductor Security Bulletin.
Vulnerability Details Background: RLC Data Block Formats in GPRS vs E-GPRS In GPRS, an LLC layer PDU can be up to 1560 bytes long, but the maximum size for an RLC data block is between 22 and 52 bytes for GPRS, depending on the Coding Scheme used (22/32/38/52 for the GPRS coding schemes CS-1/2/3/4, respectively).